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In the transitional  period, regulatory  policy should assign to
banks primary  responsibility  for achieving  fundamental  objec-
tives:  establishing  and  maintaining  the integrity  of the  payments
system  and the safety  of depositors'  savings, and ensuring  that
money  markets  function.  It should  encourage  nonbank  financial
institutions  to pursue  other objectives  such as the privatization
and restructuring  of enterprises.
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Focusing  on efforts under wa, in most transi-  Many transitional  socialist  economies,  he
tional socialist  economies,  Scott  questions  observes,  adopt a policy framework  that envi-
whether  the banks  emerging  in the new policy  sions universal  banking.  He assesses  the conse-
framework  will prove viable or be supervisable.  quences  of the immediate  emergence  of financial
He offers a model  of financial  sector  structure  conglomerates,  or universal-type  banks, and
designed  to foster the development  of a sound  questions  whether  - in the face of limited
banking  system.  managerial  and institutional  capability,  limited
capability  for supervising  financial  markets,  and
In describing  the environment  in which  extraordinary  financial  market risks  - fnancial
financial  policy is being  revised,  Scott  notes that  conglomerates  simultaneously  pursuing  conflict-
the extraordinary  challenges  policymakers  face  ing fundamental  and transitional  objectives  will
might influence  the shape of policy.  He is  prove viable.
concerned  that policies  to promote  a sound
banking  system  might be overlooked  or sacri-  Scott  advocates  delaying  the emergence  of
flced.  financial  conglomerates  until skills are devel-
oped and market turmoil  subsides.  In the transi-
Fundamental  policy  objectives,  says  Scott,  tional  period,  regulatory  policy would  assign to
are those important  to long-term  economic  well-  banks primary  responsini3ity  for achieving
being.  These include  establishing  and maintain-  fundamental  objectives,  and would encourage
ing the integrity  of the payments  system  and the  nonbank  fnancial institutions  to pursue transi-
safety  of depositors'  savings,  and ensuring  that  tional objectives.  Policy  should  promote  finan-
money  markets function.  Transidonal  objectives,  cial soundness  in the banking  system,  to control
on the other  hand, relate primarily  to the imme-  the potential  costs to govenmment  of achieving  its
diate task of privatizing  and restructuring  fundamental  objectives.
enterprises.  Policymakers  must balance  inherent
conflicts  between  the two kinds of objectives
while  promoting  the achievement  of both.
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This paper focuses on efforts underway in most TSEs to revise and update financial  sector
regulatory policy.  It questions whether the banks which emerge under the new policy
framework will be supervisable  or prove viable.  The paper offers a model of financial  sector
structure designed to foster the development  of a sound banking system.
Section It of this paper briefly summarizes  the environment  in which financial sector policy
is being revised.  It notes that the extraordinary  challenges facing  policymakers  may
significantly  influence  the shape of the new policy fiamework, and raises the concern that
policies designed to promote a sound banking system may be overlooked  or sacrificed.
Section m examines in more detail the diverse objectives  of policymakers,  grouping those
objectives  into two broad categories: fundamental  objectives  and transitional  objectives.
Fundamental  objectives, those which are important  to long run economic  well-being, include
establishing  and maintaining  the integrity of the payments system and the safety of
depositors' savings, and ensuring the functioning  of the money markets. Transitional
objectives, on the other hand, primarily relate to the immediate  task of enterprise
restructuring  and privatization. A key challenge  for policymakers  is to design a policy
framework that balances inherent conflicts  among and between these fundamental  and
transitional  objectives, and thereby promotes  achievement  of both sets of objectives.
Section IV observes the tendency  in many TSEs to adopt a policy framework envisioning
universal  banting, and assesses the consequences  of the immediate  emergence of financial
conglomerates,  or universal-type  banks.  It questions  the potential viability of financial
conglomerates  pursuing conflicting  objectives  in the context of limited managerial  and
institution  capacity, limited capacity for financial  market supervision, and extraordinary
financial  market risks.  A policy framework  built around such institutions  may not achieve
policymakers' objectives.
Section V offers an alternative  policy framework. It advocates delaying the emergence  of
financial  conglomerates  until skills are developed  and market turmoil subsides. Over this
transitional  period, regulatory  policy would assign to banks primary responsibility  for
2achieving  fundamental  objectives,  and would  promote  the role of non-bank  financial
institutions  in pursuit  of transitional  objectives. Policy  would  be designed  to promote  the
financial  soundness  of the banking  system  so as to control  the potential  costs  to government
of assuring  achievement  of its fundamental  objectives.
I1. BACKGROUND
Policymakers  in European  and Eurasian  TSEs  are confronted  with  complex  challenges
regarding  both the financial  and real sectors  of the economy. The financial  sector  typically
is dominated  by a limited  number  of large state-owned  banks. The financial  condition  of the
banks  largely  reflects  that of the real sector,  which  requires  restructuring,  debt relief  and
new  investment.  Governments  wish  to transfer  ownership  of many  of these  financial
institutions  and enterprises  to the private  sector  over time,  and the privatization  process  is
entangled  in the process  of organizational  and financial  restructuring.
While  the authorities  are attempting  to deal  with  restructuring  and privatization,  they are at
the same  time completely  overhauling  financial  sector  legislation. New  laws relating  to
banking,  central  banking,  securities  markets,  investment  funds,  and insurance  will sharply
redefine  the regulatory  policy  framework.  Supervisory  bodies  are being  established  or
reoriented,  and are developing  regulations  which  further  redefine  the policy  framework.
In establishing  the new  policy  framework,  policymakers  are stnving  to achieve  divergent,
often  conflicting,  objectives. Prominent  among  them  are those  dealing  with  the challenges  of
administering  and financing  the transition. For example,  in the face  of insufficient  fiscal
resources  and limited  available  private  capital,  the authoAities  may  directly  or indirectly  tap
the state-owned  banks  for needed  finance. These  banks  may be asked  to play significant
roles in the enterprise  restructuring  process,  and in enterprise  privatization.  More  generally,
banks  may  be called  upon to take  the lead  in financing  and administering  the development  of
the capital  markets. As the challenges  of transition  are likely  to be viewed  as priorities  by
policymakers,  there is a risk that transitional  objectives  such  as these  will be major
determinants  of the emerging  policy  framework. More  fundamental  objectives  geared  toward
fostering  a sound  banking  system  which  lays  a foundation  for higher  and more  stable  long
run growth  may be overlooked  or sacrificed.
3M. OBWECTIVES  OF BANK  REGULATORY  POLICY
Regulatory  policies  gcwerning  banking  systems  reflect  diverse  and conflicting  objectives. It
is common  for countries  to adopt  certain  fundamental  objectives  relating  to the role of banks
in a modern  economy. Beyond  these, governments  frequently  adopt  ancillary  objectives,
such  as those  directing  finance  to certain  sectors  or enterprises. In the TSE  context,  these
ancillary  objectives  often  relate  to the challenges  of transition.
Fundamental  Objectives  and Financial  Soundness
The achievement  of certain  fundamental  objectives  of bank regulaaon  can serve  as a
foundation  for economic  stability  and growth. These  fundamental  objectives  include:
o  Safeguard  depositors'  funds  and thus  promote  confidence  in the financial  system;
o  Preclude  systemic  threats  to the payments  system;
o  Ensure  orderly  implementation  of monetary  policy;  and
o  Promote  efficient  intermediation.
In the transitional  environment,  banks  are the major  deposit-takers,  are the only  participants
in the payments  system,  and are the dominant  players  in the money  markets,  on which
implementation  of monetary  policy  depends. As such, the authorities  can assure  achievement
of many  of the fundamental  objectives  by ensuring  the financial  soundness  of the banking
system. A financially  sound  banking  system  is one comprised  predominately  of solvent  and
liquid  banks. Depositors'  funds  are safeguarded  by the ability  of the system  to absorb  the
losses  of banks  that become  insolvent. The ability  of the system  to settle  its obligations
eliminates  potential  threats  to the payments  system  and the money  markets. When  the
bankdng  system  is financially  sound,  the need  for extraordinary  intervention  to support  the
solvency  or liquidity  of banks  is minimized.  Required  interventions  can be affected  within
the normal  operating  authority  and capability  of the central  bank or deposit  protection
scheme.
4Financial  soundness  is jeopardized  when  the risks  incurred  by banks  exceed  that which  their
capital  supports. Usually  excessive  risks  arise  from the process  of intermediation;  resources
are poorly  allocated  and loans  are not repaid. Absent  systemic  financial  soundness,  the
system  is unable  to meet  the collective  obligations  of its members  to depositors  and money
market  creditors. The payments  system  and the money  markets  can be comprised.
Moreover,  distorted  incentives  in the relatively  larger  numt-er  of troubled  banks  will threaten
the overall  efficiency  of intermediation.
When  the banking  system  lacks  the financial  capacity  to meet  its collective  obligations,
achievement  of many  of the fundamental  objectives  can only be assured  through
extraordinary  intervention;  the authorities  must  step  in to fulfill  the obligations  of failing
banks. In practice,  governments  or central  banks  almost  invariably  fulfill  failing  banks'
obligations  to other financial  institutions  for payments  system  settlements,  including  the
settlement  of maturing  money  market  transactions,  in order to prevent  the failure  of an
individual  bank triggering  systemic  collapse. And with  only somewhat  less frequency,
payments  are made  to depositors  on behalf  of failing  banks. Lacking  systemic  financial
soundness,  required  interventions  can be frequent  and sizeable.'
Transitional Qbjecives
Policymakers  understandably  pursue  objectives  in addition  to those  noted  above. Some
transitional  objectives  may be consistent  with the financial  soundness  of the banking  system,
but others may  not be so.  Among  the most  common,  often  conflicting  transitional  objectives
are the following:
o  Cease  financing  and liquidate  non-viable  firms;
o  Continue  to provide  quasi-fiscal  finance  to less than credit-worthy  borrowers  to
minimize  unemployment;
'noe authoities  may  attempt  to avoid a prnnmawnt  twnsfer  of resources  by sppoting the liquidity  of failing  banb.  But  with  limited
exception,  what is intnded to be temporay itquidity  support  evolves  into  prmanent  solvency  support, and  results  in a higher  long run  cost.
5o  Work  with  enterprise  managers  to develop  restructuring  proposals,  and support  those
proposals  by writing-off  and restructuring  enterprise  debts  and lending  for new
investment;
o  Participate  in the privatization  of enterprises  by fimancing  the pur'hase of enterprises
by the private  sector,  acquiring  enterprises  on behalf  of customers  (e.g. via mutual
funds),  acquiring  enterprise  equities  as portfolio  investments,  and underwriting  share
offerings;  and
o  Supply  the capital  base necessary  to support  development  of the capital  markets
industry,  and perhaps  the insurance  industry.
Many  of these  transitional  objectives  involve  capital  market  activities  for which  there is little
recent  precedent  in most  TSEs.
B=ing  Conflicting  Objectives
In designing  financial  sector  policy,  policymakers  must  reconcile  the manner  in which
conflicting  objectives  are to be achieved  in the context  of a modernized  financial  sector
structure. To avoid  destabilizing  interventions,  policymakers  must  balance  the desired  role
of banks  in fulfillment  of fundamental  and transitional  objectives  with the goal of maintaining
the financial  soundness  of the banking  system. A key factor  in making  this tradeoff  is the
role that bank supervision  can be expected  to play. Supervision  might  be relied  upon  to
ensure  the financial  soundness  of the system  regardless  of the risks  inherent  in the policy
framework. But experience  demonstrates  that bank  supervision  often  is excessively  relied
upon  to preclude  problems  whose  root is poor or overly-ambitious  policy.
In the TSE 'environment,  bank  supervision  will evolve  slowly,  and must  not be relied  upon  as
the means  by which  financial  soundness  will be maintained.  In the absence  of effective
supervision,  it is the policy  framework  itself  that must  be designed  to offer a reasonable
expectation  of engendering  a financially  sound  banking  system. The policy  tradeoffs
involved  might  imply  sacrificing  some  price efficiency  in intermediation  (a fundamental
objective)  in order to support  higher  risk-adjusted  returns  that can  contribute  to bank
6financial  soundness.  Further,  they might  imply  limiting  the role of banks  in riskier  financial
market  activities,  many  of which  are inherent  in the transitional  objectives.
IV. FINANCIAL  SECTOR  STRUCTURE
The new  policy  framework  will largely  reshape  financial  sector  structure  in TSEs. It will
define  permissible  types  of financial  institutions,  determine  the range  of activities  in which
each  type can engage,  and govem  ownership  and control  of financial  institutions.  What
emerges  as the new  structure  of the banking  and financial  systems  will significantly  influence
the means  by which  the fundamental  and transitional  objectives  of bank regulation  are to be
achieved.
Financial  sector  structures  in the world's  largest  financial  markets  serve  as important  models
for TSE policymakers.  In those  markets,  clear trends  have  been  evident  over  the past few
decades. These  countries  have  seen  an erosion  of the historic  distinctions  between  different
types  of financial  institutions  and financial  products,  and the easing  of many  regulatory
barriers  to activities  outside  financial  institutions'  traditional  lines  of business. The result of
these  trends  has been  the emergence  of diversified  financial  services  conglomerates  that can
conduct  a broad  range of financial  activities,  including  commercial  banking,  securities,  funds
management  and, most  recently,  insurance. 2
In many  TSEs  there  exists  a tendency  to adopt  a financial  sector  structure  that entails  the
immediate  emergence  of financial  conglomerates,  in universal  bank form or otherwise. This
tendency  not only reflects  developments  in the largest  markets,  but also is consistent  with the
existing  high degree  of concentration  in TSE financial  sectors,  where large state-owned  banks
dominate  the financial  system. Policymakers  may  attempt  to ascribe  to these  banks  virtually
all roles in the recast  financial  sector. The intent  of this section  is to assess  the consequences
of a financial  sector  structure  envisioning  the immediate  emergence  of large financial
2 thi paper  defines  fianci ietvices  cnglonmres  (or  more  succinotly,  fincia  conglomenrate)  u any  financial  institution  that
conducts  more  than  blndi and  deposit-takg,  whether  directly  or through  subries.  One  form  of finncia conglomeente  I the  Indy
'unlvetal  bank,  which  conducb  the  dhl  tanpg  of financial  activities  in a singe  lega etaity.  In another  form,  ceain activies  (most
commonly  innce  undenwitin)  are  conducted  though  subidiries. Stdif  another  vart  is  whore  the  parent  b not  a bank,  such  as  In  a
holding  company  dtmoture.
7conglomerates  which  play extensive  roles in all financial  markets. Is this path consistent
with  achievement  of the varied  objectives  of regulatory  policy?
In response  to this question,  the following  line of reasoning  is adopted. By  definition,  banks
have  a key role to play in fulfilling  the fundamental  objectives. If banks  can be put on a
financially  sound  footing,  and can maintain  their financial  soundness,  most  fundamental
objectives  of bank regulation  are likely  to be achieved  without  further  extraordinary
governmental  intervention. 3 Limited  governmental  resources  can  be directed  toward  other
uses. On the other hand, if financial  sector  structure  is to be based  on financial
conglomerates,  the existing  banks  will  form the core of these  conglomerates,  and those  banks
wiJl  be relied  upon  to play  the lead  role in pursuing  transitional  objectives. Should  this role
impair  banks' financial  soundness,  governments  may  be forced  unexpectedly  into
extraordinary  interventions  to meet  the obligations  of failing  banks, at a potentially
destabilizing  fiscal  or monetary  cost. Moreover,  the failure  of such  banks  would  likely
jeopardize  achievement  of transitional  objectives  by threatening  the operations  of the
fledgling  capital  markets  and disrupting  key components  of the bank  and enterprise
privatization  process. Therefore,  in adopting  a policy  framework  allowing  the immediate
emergence  of financial  conglomerates,  policymakers  must  be cognizant  of the incremental
obstacles  to potential  bank  viability  inherent  in such  a structure.
Key  Issues  for Financial  Conglomerate  Viability
With  the evolution  of banks  into financial  conglomerates,  they will be expected  to pursue
transitional  objectives  by participating  in the financing  and administration  of the restructuring
and privadzation  of enterprises. The  resulting  expansion  in the scope  of activities  of banks
and the wider  variety  of risks they  incur must  be evaluated  in the context  of i) managerial
and institutional  capacity,  and ii) the capacity  for effective  financial  market  supervision.
o  Managerial  and Institutional  Capacity
Probably  the most  important  determinant  of the soundness  of a fi-qncial  institution  is the
quality  of its management.  But with few exceptions  among  TSEs, bank managers  have  little
' 7W#  paper  does  am addre the extraordinary  governmentl  intervention  required  to rapitaliz  Insolvent ankb,  ad  thus  put banks  on
a financialy  sound footg  initially.
8experience  running  large financial  organizations  subject  to market  forces. Their  ability  to
comprehensively  evaluate  financial  and operational  risk is not well developed. An expansion
of banks' scope  of activities  and riskiness  will magnify  the challenge  facing  management.
Large, diverse  financial  conglomerates  may be inconsistent  with  existing  management
capacity.4
The task  facing  management  is exacerbated  by banks' lack  of institutional  capacity.
Accounting  and data processing  systems  are not in place. Internal  controls  exist  in onlv
piecemeal  fashion. Management  informadon  systems  are rudimentary,  and their  reliability  is
compromised  by the lack  of accounting  and internal  control  integrity. As a consequence,
institutional  capacity  may  not adequately  support  existing  operations,  much  less a substantial
expansion  of banks' activities. Management's  efforts  would  best  be employed  reorienting
banks' policies,  procedures  and processes  toward  basic  banking  operations  in a market
economy.
Should  policy  precipitate  an expansion  of batiks'  activities,  the greater  number  of customer
classes  and wider  range  of roles  played  by banks  in the financial  markets  will increase  the
extent  to which  they confront  situations  involving  potential  conflicts  of interest. Conflicts
will arise  between  the interests  of the bank  and its customers,  and between  various  classes  of
customers  (e.g. depositors,  trust  beneficiaries,  securities  purchasers,  borrowers,  securities
issuers). Conflicts  of interest  pose  substantive  operational  risks which  are normally
contained  by rather  sophisticated  institutional  procedures  intended  to segregate  information
flows  and decision-making  responsibilities.  Such  procedures  do not exist  in TSE banks  and
will not easily  be adopted. As a result, the operational  risks arising  from the greater
incidence  of situations  involving  conflicting  interests  may  threaten  the integrity  and potential
viability  of banks. 5
As noted,  to fulfill  transitional  objectives  banks  will be asked  to participate  extensively  in the
capital  markets. While  some  capital  market  activities  may  be viewed  as roughly  equivalent
to traditional  bank lending  activities  (e.g investment  in bonds),  extensive  participation  in the
4  'Ie  quality  of maaemet  wil be influened  by ncivees aris  from  the  nature  of bmak  ownersip. Sound  maaement  may  be
tbreatened  whom  polcynake  permit  contoiniqg  ownrlthip  of finnci  conglomeates  by nofinanioal fims.
' lbe incidenc  and  conequec  of conflict  situadon  wi  be geter  Ull  should  policymakers  permit  controing  ownenhip  of financial
conglomat  by nonfinaial firm.
9capital markets, and particularly  the equity market, will expose banks to new and substantial
risks.  Equity holding  are more difficult to value than are loans or bonds, and their values
are more volatile. 6 Beyond  the difficulty  of valuation, equity holdings give rise to
substantial,  perhaps unmanageable,  interest rate and liquidity  risks. 7
In pursuing transitional  objectives, banks may be left with sizeable  direct equity holdings,  the
consequence  either of the conversion of enterprise debt into equity, or the acquisition  of
equities  during the enterprise privatization  process.  Banks  also may find themselves
indirectly  exposed to equity risks where they finance the acquisition  of state-owned  equities
by managers or other private sector investors, and when they sponsor equity mutual funds.
These exposures, beyond presenting substantial  financial  risks, will compound  the demands
placed on bank management,  and will exacerbate  the incidence  of conflict of interest
situations. To the extent that bankers  are asked to play the role of shareholder  in non-
financial  firms, they are distracted from the priority task of establishing  and managing
soundly functioning  banks.  To the extent that banks are asked to play the role of investor,
underwriter, distributor and funds manager  in the equity securities markets, the potential  for
corruption and abuse of conflicts of interest will be increased substantially.
O  Sunervision  Capacity
The capacity for effective  financial  sector supervision  in most TSEs is limited.  Managers of
supervisory  agencies are struggling  with organization, recruitment  and training. Some have
inherited a large complement  of unqualified  individuals. Others are starting from scratch.
Where the agency is part of the central bank or finance ministry, these efforts take place in
the context of the reorganization  of much larger institutions  with diverse and conflicting
goals.  In most cases, supervisory  processes have yet to be developed. The procedures and
processes necessary for off-site  analysis, on-site inspections,  enforcement  and failure
resolution are not in place.
6 AsBseSiag  the value of a performing  loan requires  a deterrnintion that  sufficient  cash flow will continue  to be generated  to service  the
debt over its life.  Asessing the projected  value of the  borrower's equity  over the same period cannot  be accomplished  with  any comparable
degree  of certainty.  Even an assesment of a non-performing  loan supported  by collteral is more asured. Only in the case of an
unsecured  non-performing  loan is the  task of evaluation  comptaable  to that  for the equity of the firm.
' To the extent that  equity holdinp exceed  the bnk's  capital,  they may be funded  by interest bearing  liabilities. No ready  means  exids
to manage  the  resulting  interes  rate exposure. Similrly, a portfolio  of TSE equity securities  is tikely  to be iHiquid.
10The difficulty  in achieving  effective  supervision  is compounded  by the state of development
of banks and the financial  markets. Since accounting  and management  information  systems
are poor and lack transparency,  supervisors  cannot rely upon the routine availability  of
accurate information  regarding individual  transactions  or overall risks.  Since the financial
markets are underdeveloped  and subject  to many distortions, assessing  the riskiness  of
transactions  is difficult.  Since ownership  of many assets is changing, and shareholdings  in
bearer form are common, supervisors  are hard pressed to determine  linkages among banks,
managers, major shareholders,  and related non-financial  firms.  Under conditions  such as
these, the ability to effectively  supervise  banks is limited.
An expansion  of the scope of banks' activities  at this time will exacerbate  the demands
placed on the agency responsible  for effecting the consolidated  supervision  of the institution,
regardless of the precise form of financial  conglomerates  envisioned in each country. 8 For
example, where policy permits universal  banks, bank supervisors either need to supervise  all
financial  services activities, or oversee  the work of specialized  functional  supervisors
responsible for supervision  of certain activities conducted  by the universal bank.  Where
policy requires that banks conduct some  activities through subsidiaries,  the bank's exposure
to risks incurred by its subsidiary  cannot be limited to its investment  in that subsidiary.'
Again, bank supervisors  either need to directly supervise the subsidiary,  or oversee the work
of specialized  functional  supervisors. Finally, where the conglomerate  is structured such that
the F. -ent is not a bank, the exposure of banks to risks run by non-bank financial  institutions
witiin the conglomerate  would be constrained  by "firewalls" intended  to limit access by non-
banks to the capital of the bank.  But in practice such firewalls are not likely to be effective,
and again the bank supervisors have to oversee the work of other supervisors.' 0
As the scope of activities  and diversity  of banks expand, the nature of bank supervision
changes.  It has been the experience  in the larger financial  markets that supervisors can rely
less on prudential rules to adequately  control overall risk in financial  conglomerates.
Supervision  of these diverse institutions  is more dependent  on qualitadive  assessments  of
'  he principle  of consolidated  supervison  is a basic tenet  of internationally  accepted  bank supervision  practice.
'In times  of  'risis,  banks  usuly  ua conVpeled  to extend  additional  credits  to the subsidiary.
I  bese exis  considerable  skepticismn  regading the potental  effectiveness  of firewafls  in the larger financial  markets;  firewalls  tend  to
break downjut  when they were designe to become  operative.  In the words  of a prominent  U.S. bank supervisor,  firewaHs  become  *walls
of fire.
11institutionalized  risk management  and control systems, and on assessments  of capital
adequacy in terms of the reported and perceived overall riskiness  of the institution."  But as
noted, such systems generally  do not exist in TSE banks.  This lack of information  integrity
and transparency  will preclude supervisors' ability to assess the overall riskiness and
financial  condition of the conglomerate. In contrast, banks operating in a limited number of
markets or with a limited role in those markets can be supervised  more readily by the
application  of prudential rules designed to limit risk and ensure the maintenance  of a certain
level of liquidity, reserves and capital.  Determining  compliance  with prudential rules can be
accomplished  by supervisors  who have a basic level of training and experience. Thus, the
rapidity with which effective  bank supervision  is implemented  can depend substantially  on the
nature of the banks to be supervised.
To conclude, the design of financial  sector policy should promote achievement  of both
fundamental  and transitional  objectives. There are numerous  substantive  obstacles to the
prospective financial  soundness  and viability of financial  conglomerates  in the TSE
environment. Effective  bank supervision  cannot  be relied upon to prevent problems  that may
arise as banks attempt to assume a vastly expanded  role in the financial  sector.  Given these
constraints, a strategy that envisions  the immediate  emergence  of large, diverse financial
conglomerates,  and that relies on those institutions  to achieve all financial  sector objectives,
may prove unsuccessful. Policymakers  might best give consideration  to alternative  financial
sector structures.
V.  AN ALTERNATIVE  APPROACH  TO FINANCIAL  SECTOR  POLICY
This section proposes an alternative  approach to financial  sector development  during the early
years of transition. In broad terms, it would promote the role of banks, funded primarily by
deposits, in achievement  of the fundamental  objectives, and promote the role of non-banks,
funded with liabilities  other than deposits, in achievement  of transitional  objectives. After
some period of time, the roles of both sets of institutions  could converge.
" 'Me adoption  of an intenational standard  for capital  adequacy  by the  Basle  Conunittee  on Banking  Supervision  was a significan first
step in this direction.
12The policies  proposed here could be affected under a variety of legal arrangements.
Particularly  where financial  sector legislation has yet to be revised, these policies could be
reflected in the new legislation. Alternatively,  these policies largely could be proscribed
under the prudential rules adopted by supervisors,  provided that the legal framework grants
bank supervisors the power to restrict the scope of operations of new banks, and to narrow
the scope of operations of existing banks.  As such, this policy framework  can be compatible
with legislation  permitting financial  conglomerates  and universal-type  banking.  In effect, it
would guide the manner in which such institutions  emerged.
The Nature and Role of Banks
Policy with regard to banks would aim to promote achievement  of the fundamental  objectives
by promoting the financial  soundness  of the banking system, thereby minimizing  the potential
for required extraordinary governmental  interventions. Through the use of strict licensing
procedures, only a limited number of banks would  be permitted.  Banks would be granted the
exclusive  right to raise funds through instruments  labeled "deposits". Deposits  would be
protected  by a government-backed  protection  program.  It would  be mandatory  for the
savings and transaction  accounts  of households  to be covered by the deposit protection
progrm,  and thus banks would have exclusive  right to offer such accounts  to househoids.
Banks and the central bank would share responsibility  for ensuring the integrity of the
payments system settlement  process.  Prudential  rules would limit the risks banks could run
and require the maintenance  of relatively high liquidity, reserves  and capital.  (The Appendix
provides a detailed listing of sample  prudential  rules.)  Adherence to prudential rules and
sound bankdng  practice would be subject to close supervision. Ownership  and managerial
linkages between banks and non-banks,  both financial  institutions  and enterprises, would be
restricted  initially.' 2
Policy would strive to balance  the tradeoffs involved  in permitting banks to play as great a
role in the processes of transition  as is consistent  with financial  soundness. This tradeoff is
most important when determining  the role of banks in corporate finance. Corporate lending
'2Tbe small  cooperative  institutions  encountered  in most TSEs would  have  to form  and  bc members  of one of a limited number  of
cantral  instituions', each of which  would  be licensed  and regulated  as a bak.  Tbe  central institution  would clear and setle payments  for
itsi  members,  act as lender  of last resot, provide technical  assisnce  nd bear responsibility  for their prudent operation. Whie cooperatives
would have  the same  powens  as would banks,  their activities  might be rsticted  either  by the central  instituion  or by the  bank  supervisors.
13in the TSE  environment  is highly  risky. To foster  sound  lending,  loan  portfolios  must  be
well diversified,  mostly  secured  and mostly  short  term. Prudential  rules would  mandate  such
practices. Loan  diversification  would  be promoted  by application  of a relatively  conservative
large exposures  limit' 3. Other  prudential  rules would  establish  conservative  collateral  and
maturity  requirements.  As a consequence,  banks' role  would  be to offer primarily  secured
working  capital  finance  to small  and medium  scale  companies.  Credits  to larger borrowers
could  be arranged  on a consortium  basis. By  utilizing  the best  available  credit skills, such
lending  might  be conducted  without  systematicaly  jeopardizing  financial  soundness.
Banks  would  provide  a safe  place for the risk adverse  to maintain  their  deposits  in virtually
unlimited  amount. The fundamental  objective  of deposit  safety  would  be assured  through
government  backing  of a deposit  protection  program. The essential  characteristics  of the
program  are that it apply to aU  banks,  that its coverage  limits  be relatively  high,  and that it
have  unequivocal  government  backing. To reflect  the value  to depositors  uiA  the protection
provided  by the government,  and to minimize  moral  hazard,  interest  rates payable  on bank
deposits  would  be restricted  by regulation. Deposit  interest  rates  generally  would  not exceed
those  on government  paper of comparable  maturity. Moreover,  deposit  interest  rates might
be held to slightly  negative  real terms,  in part as a means  to promote  the growth  of non-
banks.14
Banks'  would  be permitted  to conduct  only  limited  activities  in foreign  currencies. Funding
and investment  in foreign  currencies  would  be subject  to conservative  limits  on open
positions  (precluding  mismatches  in currencies  and in time). To the extent  that banks  are not
required  by regulation  to on-lend  foreign  currency  deposits  to the central  bank, permissible
foreign  currency  investments  would  be prescribed. Lending  in foreign  currency  would  be
limited  to borrowers  clearly  generating  sufficient  foreign  currency  revenues  to service  the
debt.
" Lg.  expowi  limbs,  or lenadg im,  establish  the maximm amount a a bW*  con load to a digle obligor  or reated group  of
obgor.  The lit  is typicaly expresd u  a percent  of the  ba's  capital. See tde  Appendix.
"Thi  pae  prsmes  tht govm  wi  protct mot depost,  even  where  no explicit  coi.rage exis.  Adopting  explcit depoait
protection  coupled  wih interest  rate  regulation  for protected  accounta  is employed  u an equitable  meua of paning on to depositr  pat of
the coat  of this  protecton. Te  value  of such  protcdon  might  be gt  given  the level of ficial  market dsks, conceivablyjuwdfying
negative  real  rt "r.
14Banks'  role  in the capital  markets  would  be limited. Banks  would  be permitted  to invest  in,
trade,  and lend against  government  securities. Banks  would  be permitted  to investment  in
corporate  debt securities,  subject  to the exposure  limits  applicable  to lending,  and would  be
permitted  to lend to securities  firms  against  such  securities  issued  by third  parties.
Investments  in or lending  against  equities  would  be permitted  only in exceptional
circumstances.  Banks  could  take  equities  as part of the renegotiation  of bad debts,  provided
that the equity  was booked  at a nominal  value  and was sold  within  a short  period.
Underwriting,  distribution,  and trading  of corporate  debt or equity  securities  would  be
prohibited. Banks  would  not be permitted  to offer  pooled  investment  management  services
(e.g. mutual  funds)." 5 With  the prior approval  of the relevant  supervisors,  banks  could  play
certain  fee-based  agency  and advisory  roles, such  as acting  as corporate  advisor  on capital
markets  transactions,  serving  as a depository  for mutual  funds,  or engaging  in securities
transactions  on an agency  basis  at the request  of a customer. Given  these  restrictions,  banks
would  play virtually  no formal  role in the management  of enterprises,  and would  fulfill  only
administrative  roles in enterprise  privatization  process.
Banks'  role in the insurance  market  would  be limited. Banks  would  not be permitted  to
underwrite  insurance. With the prior approval  of the bank  and insurance  supervisors,  banks
would  be permitted  to distribute  insurance  products  underwritten  by others  for a fee.
Additional  prudential  rules would  serve  to limit  riskiness  and ensure  sufficient  capital. Rules
imiting  interest  rate mismatches  would  minimize  the interest  rate risk incurred  by banks.
Rules  requiring  maintenance  of minimum  levels  of liquid  assets  wouid  foster  liquidity,  and
would  serves  as a trigger  point  for supervisory  attention." To minimize  the risk of
insolvency,  banks  would  be subject  to high  provisioning  requirements  and high  capital  ratios.
Part of the earnings  necessary  to generate  reserve  and capital  formation  would  be derived  via
the indirect  subsidy  banks  receive  from  the government's  protection  of bank deposits,  on
which  relatively  lower  rates  of interest  would  be paid. The benefits  of this low cost  funding
base would  accrue  directly  to the banks,  and no policy  constraints  would  attempt  to pass
these  benefits  on to certain  classes  of borrowers. The higher  spreads  will enable  banks  to
" fiidl  duclay uice  could  be offered.
"Simple  aaet-bued liquidity  nles will likely  prove uffrcient,  at leat until  the money  markets  become  moe higy  developed.
15build high mandatory  provisions and capital, and to generate sufficient returns on capital.
Consistent with the goal of financial  soundness,  tax policy would promote the accumulation
of provisions by banks.
As a consequence  of this policy approach, banks would  be simpler and thus better matched to
the skdlls  of managers  and institutional  capacity.  Limits on banks' scope of activities  would
reduce the incidence of conflict of interests and promote increased transparency. Rules
designed to preclude direct or indirect exposure to equity markets would  preclude many
potential conflicts of interest, prevent the assumption  of substantial  financial  risks, minimize
the potential for systemic  losses in the capital markets from spreading to the banking sector,
and reduce the burden on limited managerial  resources arising from banks' role in enterprise
govemance and management.
Under this policy approach, bank supervision  can rely more upon the application  of basic
prudential rules regarding asset riskiness  and diversification,  liquidity, provisioning  and
capital, and less on the qualitative  assessments  necessary to gear capital requirements  to the
perceived riskiness  of more complex institutions  engaged in a wider range of activities. With
a modest skldl  base bank supervisors  are likely to be able to make substantial  progress in
achieving  effective  supervision. To support early implementation  of effective  bank
supervision, banks would have to be audited annually  by independent  and competent auditing
firms acceptable to the supervisors. The auditors would initially focus on the development  of
sound accounting  practices and internal controls, would be required to perform standardized
testing to determine compliance  with prudential  rules, and would play a role in assisting the
bank in implementing  corrective action when violations  of law or non-compliance  with
prudential  rules were detected.  With this cooperative  approach, the banking system is more
likely to be effectively  supervised  within a reasonable  period of time.
The Nature and Role of Non-Banks
While banks would be limited in number and highly regulated, policy would promote the
proliferation  of non-bank financial  institutions,  some forms of which would be subject to
little or no regulation.  Non-banks  could c.  juct any type of financial service  activity, with
the,  exception  that they would not be permitted to fund themselves  via instruments  labeled
"deposits". These institutions  would not be permitted to use the word "bank' in their title;
16rather they might  be known  legally  as "finance  companies",  "industrial  loan companies",
"trust  companies",  "mutual  funds",  "private  investment  companies",  "insurance  companies",
etc.17
Non-banks  would  be permitted  to raise  retail  funding,  provided  that retail  interest-bearing
funding  takes the form of "investment  certificates"  or similarly-labeled  instruments  having  a
fixed  maturity  of at least  one month. The funding  of non-banks  would  not be covered  by the
government-backed  protection  program,  and explicit  notification  that the instrument  is not
protected  by the government  would  be required."8  Interest  rates  would  be set by the
market,  serving  both to promote  the emergence  of non-banks  and to minimize  any adverse
consequence  on savings  mobilization  arising  from interest  rate restrictions  on bank  deposits.
Non-banks  would  be granted  considerable  latitude  in financial  market  activities. Non-banks
that deal  only with wholesale  customers  (including  enterprises),  or that accept  funding  from
less than a small  number  of individuals,  would  be virtuaUy  unregulated.  Non-banks  that
solicit  funding  from individuals  more  broadly  would  be subject  to regulation  and varying
degrees  of supervision.  Supervision  could  in many  cases  be organized  around  self-regulato.y
arrangements  designed  to promote  acceptance  of various  types  of institutions  by investors.
Generally,  entry  level capital  requirements  would  be minimized  to promote  the emergence  of
non-banks.
Policy  would  promote  the role of non-banks  in achieving  transitional  objectives. For
example,  non-banks  would  be expected  to play a principal  role in the enterprise  privatization
process,  primarily  by sponsoring  open  and closed-end  mutual  funds,  or similar  such  vehicles,
that solicit  funds  for investment  in the shares  of newly  privatized  enterprises. The regulation
of such  entities  would  focus  on adequate  disclosure,  particularly  with  regard  to any conflicts
of interest,  and fair marketing  practices. Open-ended  funds  would  be subject  to
diversification  rules."' Non-banks  similarly  could  solicit  funds  for long  term investment
lending  to enterprises,  perhaps  via the purchase  of convertible  or equity-linked  bonds
"lbo  famnonaWl  ,eI  playod  by lneo  cowmanies  my  mare  closely  prel  that  of bnk,  and  th  insurance  conpanies  should  be
subject  to specaized roguation  and  superon.  Inwac  company  regulation  and spervision  is not addressd fuhehr  in this  papor.
' To promote  this polcy, non-nb  that accept  inte-bran  fundg  might  be requied to ue  sndardized or p-approved contcts
tht cleady  diffentite  the instument  fiom a bank  deposit.
" See  BC  Counci  Directive  8S/611  for  approprite  diverification les.
17issuances. Non-banks  would  be expected  to function  as stockbrokers  and would  operate
stock  exchanges.20
Non-banks  could  offer payment  services  to corporate  entities. However,  most  non-banks
would  have  to settle  their  payment  transactions  through  a bank. Only  certain  individual  non-
banks  would  be permitted  to settle  directly,  subject  to the approval  of the central  bank and
representatives  from the bank-based  organization  responsible  for managing  the settlement
process.
Relationship  of Banks,  Non-banks  and Government
A key challenge  in balancing  the achievement  of fundamental  and transitional  objectives
under  this policy  framework  is to preclude  losses  incurred  by non-banks  from either
jeopardizing  the financial  soundness  of the banking  system, or being  of such  a large scale
that direct  governmental  intervention  is required  on behalf  of failing  non-banks. Several
policies  are critical  to achieving  this balance. First, the customers  of failing  non-banks
would  be expected  to bear fully  the losses  associated  with that failure. Second,  policy
applicable  to non-banks  would  attempt  to limit  market  concentration  to minimize  the potential
that a non-bank  grows  so large  that its imminent  failure  would  itself  represent  a systemic
threat  requiring  extraordinary  governmental  intervention.  Third, most  ownersip and
management  linkages  between  banks  and non-banks  would  be precluded,  both  to minimize
direct  financial  and moral  linkages  between  banks  and non-banks  and to ensure  arms-length
decision  making  regarding  transactions.  Finally,  all bank transacdons  with non-banks  would
be subject  to the same  exposure  limits  that apply  to corporate  entities. 2 1
Despite  these  policies,  a considerable  volume  of bank/non-bank  transactions  will occur.
Banks  will need  to settle  payment  transactions  for non-banks,  and will  likely  engage  in
substantive  money  market  transactions  with  non-banks.  As such, banks  may  have  to cover
the potential  illiquidity  of non-banks.  These  advances,  in addition  to other credit  exposures,
would  be put at risk if the non-bank  becomes  insolvent. The insolvency  of non-bank can
" Sinc,  banb  wold  ot be perminted  to be cleing amem  of  ock  exchans, by  InplHaton,  goverment  scuri  would  not  be
taded on ock exchanges  under  ts  poicy  framwork.
"With  posible  exceptions  for  shoal  term  money  maet tanctioons.
18potentially  lead  to the insolvency  of a bank  and threaten  bankdng  system  financial  soundness.
As such, an important  function  of banks  would  be to monitor  their  credit  exposures  to non-
banks  and to promote  the prudent  operation  of their  non-bank  clients. Initially  at least, banks
might  insist  that most  operations  with non-banks  be conducted  on a secured  basis.22
After  managerial  and supervisory  skills  are developed,  the financial  markets  become  better
established,  and market  turmoil  subsides,  cross-ownership  restrictions  between  banks  and
other financial  institutions  gradually  could  be lifted  to allow  the emergence  of diversified
financial  services  conglomerates.  At the same  time  the activities  of the various  supervisory
agencies  would  have  to be harmonized  in order  to ensure  the consolidated  supervision  of
those  institutions.
For exaVipl,  claug  aund  Weamen  conducted  on behlf of  onbanka  could  bo uappod  by pledged  govoen  ewurccitie.
19APPENDIX
Sample  Prudential  Framework  for Banks
This prudential  framework  reflects  the policy  proposals  set forth  in the paper. It is designed
to promote  the financial  soundness  of the banking  system  over the transitional  period, defmed
here as five years, by limiting  banks' overall  riskiness  and promoting  the maintenance  of
adequate  levels  of reserves  and capital. This framework  would  be established  under
legislation  and the rules of the supervisor.
Financia Sector Structur
o  Banks  would  constitute  a clearly  defined  and delineated  class  of financial  institution.
Ownership  of banks  by other  legal entities  (or related  individuals  and legal entities)
would  be limited  to 25%  of the bank's shares. Limited  exceptions  to this limit  might
be permitted,  such  as in the case of ownership  by a well-supervised  foreign  bank.
Beginning  in 5 years,  this limit  would  be phased  out with respect  to ownership  by
other  financial  institutions.
a  Banks  would  be allowed  only  limited  ownership  interests  in non-bank  financial
institutions,  such  as securities,  funds  management  and insurance  companies,  primarily
to facilitate  divestitures  that might  be required  for banks  to conform  to the regulatory
policy  framework  outlined  in this paper. Investments  in and loans  to such  companies
would  be limited  to 10%  of bank  capital  per institudon,  and 25% in aggregate. The
ownership  interests  of a bank would  be limited  to 20%  of the non-bank  institution's
capital. Directors  and managers  of banks  could  not be employed  by or serve  as
directors  of non-bank  financial  institutions,  and vice  versa. These  limits  and
restrictions  would  be phased  out beginning  in 5 years.
o  Investments  in and loans  to non-consolidated  non-bank  financial  institutions  would  be
deducted  from capital  when  assessing  compliance  with  the minimum  capital  standard.
20o  Banks  would  be prohibited  from investing  in institutions  whose  shares  are in bearer
(non-registued)  form.
O  Banks'  shares  would  have  to be issued  in registered  form.
O  Banks  would  require  the prior approval  of the supervisors  to invest  in non-bank
flnancial  institutions,  to open new  branches,  and for all merger  and acquisitions
transactions.
Credit  Risk  and Asset  Powers
Generally,  banks  would  be permitted  to hold a diversified  portfolio  of small  and medium
scale  corporate  loans" and consumer  loans.
O  The large exposures  limit, 24 applicable  to each  obligor  (or group  of related  obligors)
would  be 15%  of banks' capital,  with a 5%  sub-limit  for unsecured  lending. A
phased-in  increase to 25% and 15% respectively  would begin after five years.25
Qualifying  collateal would  be defined,  and would  include  current  accounts
receivable,  current  inventories,  and in the case of securities  firms, corporate  bonds
issued by third  parties.
O  The sum  of all per-obligor  credit  exposures  in excess  of 10%  of banks' capital  would
be limited  to 400%  of banks' capital. A phased-in  increase  to 800%  would  begin
after five years. 26 All such  exposures  would  be reported  periodically  to the
supervisors.
O  Lending  for the construction  or acquisition  of commercial  and industrial  real estate
lending  would  be subject  to an aggegate limit  of 200%  of banks' capital.
WbiWg  mir  ben  us  oatmwt  defind  legaly  as  raeu  or  fimlg  loas.
"C  On md  off banc  As  oxuea.
u UWdr  a  popeed  Dhmodive  of be Eumopean  Comlula,  kW  g*ow  would  be limied  to 25%  of banku'  capital.  The  BC  doe
notpe  a  it  =br  unwed  lendg.
X lbpMNpoed BC U.n  *  800%.
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v  'Conservative  maximum  loan-to-value  limits  would  be established  for all forms  of real
estate  lending.
O  The holding  of equity  securities  of non-financial  firms  would  be prohibited  except
when  taken  to satisfy  previously  contracted  debts. Such  holdings  would  be booked  at
a token  value, unless  traded  on a regulated  stock  exchange,  in which  case they would
be booked  at the lower  of costi or market. Such  holdings  would  have  to be
divested  within  1 year.
o  The financing  of the purchase  of shares  by customers  would  be limited  to 50% of the
cost  of the shares  (which  would  have  to be held  as collateral),  and limited  in
aggregate  to 50% of banks' capital. Aggregate  financing  for the shares  of any one
firm would  be limited  to 25% of the firm's shares.
o  Lending  to managers,  supervisory  board  member  and shareholders  would  be limited
to an aggregate  limit  of 10%  of capital.
o  Underwriting,  distribution  and trading  of corporate  debt and equity  securities  would
be prohibited.
C*i  Markets  Actvities
o  Pooled  investment  management  would  be prohibited.  Banks  could  offer such
fiduciary  services  only on an individual,  segregated  basis.
O  Prior approval  would  be required  to offer advisory  services,  act as depository  for
mutual  investment  funds,  or conduct  agency  transactions  on behalf  of customers.
losumance  Activiie
o  Underwriting  insurance  products  would  be prohibited. With  prior approval,  banks
could sell  insurance  products  underwritten  by others.
s Where  coat  Is  eaivalent to  the nominal  amount  of debt  writen  off.
22Reserves  and Capital
Generally,  lending  would  be subject  to high  provisioning  requirements,  and a conservative
minimum  capital  rule would  be applied. Bank  supervisors  would  have  the power  to mandate
capital  in excess  of the minimum  when  considered  necessary  to support  the operation  of the
bank.
o  A general  reserve  of 2% of total loans  would  be required.
O  Specific  reserves  against  non-performing  loans  (interest  or principal  past due for 90
days or more)  would  be created  progressively  such  that the reserve  equals  100%  of
the exposure  (face  amount  less 75% of the estimated  realizable  value  of tangible
collateral)  no later than 2 years  after the loan becomes  non-performing.  Reserves
would  be required  earlier  should  the likelihood  of loss become  apparent.
O  Prudential  rules would  define  situations  presumed  to constitute  non-performance.
Rollovers  of interest  would  be limited  to 6 months  interest  in any 2 year period.
Banks  would  be required  to maintain  documentation  relathig  growth  in working
capital  lines  to non-distressed  increase  in borrower's  requirements  (e.g., increased
sales).
O  The minimum  capital  standard  would  udlize  the features  of the Basle  accord  (riskl
weighted  assets  and off-balance  sheet  exposures,  and conservative  definiton  of
capital). The minimum  ratio would  be set initially  at 12%, and would  be phased
down  to 8% beginning  in five  years. 23 Alternatively,  an 8% capital  requirement
could  be employed,  and weights  of 150%  applied  to corporate  lending.
O  In principle,  the capital  standard  must  be met on a continuous  basis.
O  Dividend  payments  would  be subject  to restricdons  to ensure  maintenance  of adequate
capital. For new  banks,  no dividends  could  be paid in first three  years  of operation
unless  approved  in exceptional  circumstances  by the supervisors. No dividends  could
2T  IbolO  mnm  i  8%.  May1y  GIG cutiesquit  h4ihet  levels  for mot bnsk.
23--.be paid if the supervisors  have  notified  the bank that its loan loss  provision  is
inadequate,  or if the general  reserve  has not been  established  or the minimum  capital
standard  is not met.
lnterest Ratesk
o  Fixed  rate loans  of over two year maturity  would  be limited  to 100%  of capital  (net
of fixed  assets)  and 80%  of long  term funding,  which  would  include  savings  accounts
without  fixed  maturity. Longer  dated  asset maturities  could  be limited  in declining
proportion  to long term funding.
Foreign  Exchange  Rate  Risk
o  Open  foreign  currency  positions  would  be limited  to 5% of capital  per currency. The
sum  of the absolute  value  of all open  positions  would  be limited  to 15  % of capital.
Interest  rate mismatches  in foreign  currencies  would  have  to be confined  to less than
six months  forward. Beyond  six months  forward,  all positions  must  be matched.
O  Foreign  currency  lending  would  be restricted  to sound  borrowers  generating  sufficient
foreign  exchange  to cover  debt service,  and would  be limited  in aggregate  to 50% of
capital.
o  Banks  would  be subject  to an asset based  liquidity  requirement.  Twenty  percent  of
banks' assets  would  held as cash, sight  deposits  in banks, or in government  paper (or
equivalent  liquid  paper).
Inerest Rates  on Protected  Deposits
o  Interest  rates  on banks  deposits  would  be restricted. At highest,  they would  be
equivalent  to the rate on government  paper of comparable  maturity  and rate structure.
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